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Abstract
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different information sharing mecha-
nisms in a common-pool resource game, with a view to finding a mechanism that is both effi-
cient and inexpensive for the managing agency. More precisely, we compare the observed
extraction levels produced as a result of three mechanisms: a mandatory information shar-
ing mechanism and two voluntary information sharing mechanisms that differ in the degree
of freedom given to the players. Our main result is that a voluntary information sharing
mechanism could help in reaching a lower average extraction level than that observed with
the mandatory mechanism.
Introduction
In economics, goods are usually classified according to two dimensions: excludability and
rivalry. A good is excludable if a person can be excluded from its consumption and is rival if its
consumption by one person reduces its consumption by another. These two dimensions make
it possible to classify goods into four categories: private goods (excludable and rival), club
goods (excludable, but not rival), common goods (non-excludable, but rival) and public goods
(non-excludable and non-rival). Public goods and common goods have the particularity of
placing individual and collective interests in apparent opposition as well as creating tension in
the choice of action, which is commonly referred to as a social dilemma. Indeed, rivalry in
extractive common goods implies that agents may think that they should consume as much of
the good as possible, fearing that the others leave nothing. Non-rivalry in public goods implies
that agents have an incentive to benefit from the goods without contributing to their produc-
tion. The phenomenon of over-exploitation of common goods was highlighted by Hardin in
1968 [1] with his famous "tragedy of the commons". However, it has been shown that in some
real-life settings, complex property rights and institutions could enable the emergence of trust
and make coordination possible, so as to attain self-governance of common goods and sustain-
ability of the resource [2–4]. On the other hand, laboratory and field investigations on com-
mon-pool resources have shown that social information, i.e. information available to
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participants about the actions of the others, is a key element for managing the resource. This
article contributes to the existing literature on this topic.
In the context of a public good game, [5] conducted a laboratory experiment in which they
tested three treatments that differed in the information available to players. In a baseline treat-
ment, players had no information about the actions of other members of their group at neither
the aggregate nor individual level. In a second treatment, the players had information about
the total contribution made by the group to the public good. Finally, in a third treatment, the
players were provided with information about both the total contribution of the group and
(anonymous) individual contributions. The data revealed significantly higher levels of contri-
bution in the last treatment. The authors explained that; in a situation of complete informa-
tion, it is not in the interest of individuals to forgo participation in the production of the
public good. The reason for this, is that even if it had just a small influence over the contribu-
tions made by the other members of the group, opportunistic behavior would inevitably lead
to lower production of the good. Signaling cooperative behavior becomes strategic in this case.
A few years later [6] found nevertheless that explicit signaling through announcements did not
improve the average level of contribution in the game. A reputation mechanism, i.e. an indi-
vidual history of past behavior in the game visible by everyone in the group, did not either. In
the context of a common-pool resource game; which is the standard representation of a com-
mon good [7, 8] tested two treatments in the laboratory. In the first treatment individuals had
aggregated information (total group extraction), and in the second treatment they had the
additional information on the individual choices and payoffs of their group members. The
authors observed that in the complete information treatment individuals extracted more and
thus moved away from the socially optimal solution. The main reason was that when complete
information was available, the individuals had a tendency to imitate the best performance (in
addition to imitating the average level of extraction in the group), which in this kind of game
means the least cooperative individual. These studies clearly show that social information
plays a very important role in social dilemmas (see also [9]). The fact that individual decisions
are public in the group, even if anonymous, is interpreted by some as the possibility of sending
a signal of cooperation. This can be beneficial to the group as it increases the production of the
public good or improves the management of the common-pool resource. However, this infor-
mation can also have harmful effects when it encourages the imitation of less cooperative
choices in the group. Information about the actions taken by all the players in the group is
therefore not necessarily beneficial. In this article we set out to establish a system of voluntary
sharing of information that keeps the beneficial effects of the dissemination of information
(signal) and mitigates its negative effects (imitation of the most selfish). Our hypothesis is that
a voluntary sharing (or disclosure) information mechanism allows the creation of selective
social information, or upward social information [10–12], which favors cooperation between
individuals.
We set up a laboratory experiment using a common-pool resource game to measure the
extent to which a voluntary sharing mechanism makes it possible to mitigate over-exploitation
of the resource compared to a system in which the collection and dissemination of informa-
tion, at an individual level, is automatic and mandatory. The fact that individual extractions
are automatically and mandatorily made public may have a negative effect on the motivations
of the individual, such as crowding-out effects [13] or boomerang effects [14] for example.
Furthermore, this implies collection and dissemination of information that escapes the indi-
vidual, who may then feel watched and not free to make their own choices [15]. Letting the
individual choose to make their level of extraction public is likely to make them feel responsi-
ble and give them the impression that they can act on the collective norm, by voluntarily
expressing what they consider to be appropriate behavior [16]. They may also feel satisfaction
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in showing their cooperation in the social dilemma; the warm-glow effect [17], and acting in a
prosocial manner that benefits other people [18]. If the most cooperative individuals voluntar-
ily share their extraction decision with the other members of their group, the social informa-
tion provided to the group is likely to favor the emergence of a cooperative descriptive norm
[19]; as observed by [10], as well as triggering conditional cooperative behavior [20]. We there-
fore believe that a voluntary, rather than mandatory, information sharing mechanism leads to
a higher level of cooperation within a group. In a common-pool resource game, this means
lower levels of resource extraction. In addition, if there is a cost for collecting and disseminat-
ing social information, it may be useful to find a mechanism that is both more efficient and
less costly [21].
Nowadays the exchange of information is extensively facilitated by connected objects and
social networks. Smartphones are constantly asking us if we want to share our information
and activities (sports activities, photos, videos, news, etc.). It is simple to share information
within a group or community, often at the click of a button. The use of common-pool
resources has also been transformed by new techniques that allow users to share and disclose
real-time information about their consumption. In the electricity sector for instance, many
countries have deployed smart grids to place data flow and information management at the
heart of improving supply efficiency. In the case of domestic water use; particularly in Western
countries, remote metering enables water services and providers to improve the efficiency of
water supplies. More real-time information about consumption is also provided to water
users, who can then adjust their habits and detect possible leaks. In France, 50% of domestic
water users should have a remote meter connected within 3 to 4 years [22]. These systems do
not yet provide water consumers with information on the consumption of others, but initia-
tives to establish social standards are underway. Benchmarks do already exist based on aggre-
gations of macro-data (city, region, and nation). In California, the law on sustainable
groundwater management; adopted by the State in 2004, obliges groundwater sustainability
agencies (GSA) to draw up groundwater sustainability plans, as well as requiring users located
outside the GSA’s management area to report their extraction levels to the State Water Board.
Conversely, in countries like Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, private water wells are proliferat-
ing rapidly [23] and information on the extraction of water from these wells is hidden by irri-
gators to avoid paying fees or penalties. Community management of aquifers has been
recognized as one of the possible instruments for groundwater management [24], but it can
only be achieved if all users commit to a cooperative scheme and share information on their
private consumption. Even so, both management costs and the attitudes of the users depend
on the policy implemented. Several voluntary information disclosure initiatives have started to
develop, such as the Carbon Disclosure Program in the field of forest degradation. This pro-
gram requires its members to disclose how they address forest risk commodities in their supply
chain [25]. A voluntary information sharing mechanism can be an important tool for regula-
tors, as it does not require that the collection of private information be organized by adding
technical tools, therefore making it much less expensive. Up until now though, its effectiveness
is yet to be proven. The purpose of this article is to test, in the laboratory, the effects of two vol-
untary information sharing mechanisms in the context of decentralized management of a
common resource. Testing the mechanism in the laboratory is a first step [26, 27], a field
experiment will be necessary in a second step to test its external validity [28].
We experimentally test two treatments based on voluntary information sharing and com-
pare the observations to a reference treatment in which information is collected and disclosed
in an automatic and mandatory manner. In the first treatment, after making their extraction
decision, the players have to decide whether or not they wish to make this extraction decision
public. In the second treatment, players have to decide whether or not they wish to make their
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extraction level public, as well as additionally deciding the amount of extraction they wish to
publicize. [21] experimentally tested two voluntary sharing mechanisms in a public good
game. Her first treatment was identical to ours, where after choosing their level of contribution
to the public good, the players had to decide whether or not they wished their contribution to
be made public to the group. In her second treatment, players decided whether or not to publi-
cize their contribution decision before making it. [21] showed that these two treatments led to
higher levels of contribution than a treatment in which contributions were automatically and
mandatorily made public. However, she did not observe any difference between the two volun-
tary sharing systems.
The contribution of our article is threefold. Firstly, we contribute to the literature on the
role and impact of social information in social dilemmas, more specifically in the context of a
common-pool resource. Secondly, we confirm that the results of [21] can be transposed into
the context of the common-pool resource game. Thirdly, we shed light on the effects of a new
voluntary sharing mechanism, which gives more freedom to individuals. Our first result is
confirmation that the mechanism of voluntary sharing of information on the chosen level of
extraction reduces the phenomenon of over-exploitation of the resource compared to auto-
matic and mandatory sharing. Our second result is that a voluntary information sharing mech-
anism in which an individual decides the value of the information disclosed is just as effective
as a mechanism that does not allow this freedom. It does however introduce strategic behav-
iors on the part of the least cooperative individuals, which in the long run, may lessen the posi-
tive effect of voluntary sharing.
Materials and methods
Experimental design
In a Common Pool Resource game (hereafter CPR), each player i in a group of N players can
extract from yi = 0 to yi = E tokens from a common resource that contains NxE tokens. E was
equal to 10 in our experiment. For each extracted token, player i earned 3 ECUs (Experimental
Currency Unit), but created a negative externality for each of the other group members. In our
experimental game, the payoff function of player i was given by πi(yi, Y) = 3yi—0.01875Y2
where Y = Si yi and yi is the individual amount extracted by player i.
To avoid a corner solution (zero-unit extraction as the socially optimal solution), we
adapted an existing model [29] by transforming the linear payoff function into a quadratic
one. Our game had features that ensured a social dilemma where individual and collective
interests were divergent. These features were: (i) whatever the amount extracted by the other
group members, player i had a higher payoff when extracting the maximum (10), and whatever
the amount extracted by i, the payoff was higher when the other group members extracted
nothing from the common resource, with the dominant strategy therefore being to extract the
maximum possible (10); (ii) the collective payoff, computed as the sum of individual payoffs,
was maximized when the total amount extracted by the group was 20 tokens, with a symmetric
issue where each player extracted exactly 5 tokens.
We tested two treatments with voluntary information sharing mechanisms in comparison
to a reference treatment with automatic and mandatory information sharing. More precisely,
in this baseline treatment; called MD for Mandatory Disclosure, the player’s extraction was
automatically and mandatorily displayed on the summary screen of each member of their
group. In the two voluntary sharing treatments, the player’s extraction was displayed on the
summary screen of each other member of their group only if they had previously chosen to
share such information. The difference between the two voluntary sharing treatments was that
in one treatment; called FD for Free Disclosure, the player could also decide the value to be
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displayed on the screens of the other members of their group while in the other treatment;
called VD for Voluntary Disclosure, the player did not have this option. Therefore, in VD if the
player had decided to make their decision public, the value seen by the other group members
was the player’s actual extraction. In FD, this was not necessarily the case, as it could have been
the actual extraction or a different value altogether, since the player was free to decide what
value to display. Table 1 summarizes the treatments.
The game used in all three treatments was the one described in the first paragraph of this
section, with fixed groups of four players formed randomly at the beginning of the game. The
game consisted of 20 rounds, with each round divided into three stages in the two voluntary
sharing treatments (extraction decision, disclosure decision and summary) and two stages in
the MD treatment (extraction decision and summary). In the extraction decision stage, the
player had to decide how many tokens to extract from the collective account, an integer
between 0 and 10. In the disclosure decision stage (only in treatments VD and FD, skipped in
treatment MD because the player didn’t have this choice) the player had to decide whether or
not they wanted their extraction to be displayed on the summary screen of their group mem-
bers, with the additional option in FD treatment to enter the value to be displayed. In the sum-
mary stage, the screen displayed (for the current round): the player’s extraction level; the total
amount extracted by their group and their payoff for the round. In the MD treatment the play-
ers were also informed of the individual extractions of all members of their group. In the VD
treatment the players were informed of the individual extractions of the group members who
had chosen to disclose this information. Likewise for FD treatments, but here the players knew
that the displayed values had been entered by the group members themselves. From each
screen the players had access to the history of the previous rounds. The history screen included
the information corresponding to each past round. Explicitly (for each past round): the extrac-
tion of the player; the total extraction of the group; the individual extractions of the members
of the group (all or some of them); the payoff of the round and the cumulative payoff since the
first round. Two important elements need to be specified. Firstly that in the disclosure decision
stage, when deciding whether to make their extraction decision public or not (and its value in
the FD treatment), the players had information on the total quantity extracted by their group
in the extraction stage. The second specification being that on the summary screen, regardless
of the treatment, the individual extractions were anonymous and this was common knowl-
edge. Indeed, on the one hand there was no associated identifier and furthermore it was speci-
fied that these values were displayed in a random order each round. Table 2 gives a summary
Table 1. Summary view of the treatments.
MD VD FD
Voluntary sharing No Yes Yes
Freedom to choose the value to be disclosed No No Yes
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240212.t001
Table 2. Stages of one round, in the three treatments.
MD VD FD
Extraction
decision stage
Player decided how much they extracted from the collective account
Disclosure
decision stage
Skipped, the
player had no
choice
Player decided whether their extraction would be
displayed on the round summary screen of their
group members
Player decided whether their extraction would be displayed on the round
summary screen of their group members, and if so, entered the value
that would be displayed
Summary stage Round summary
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240212.t002
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view of the different steps depending on the treatment. The instructions of the experiment are
available at https://dx.doi.org/10.17504/protocols.io.bgxzjxp6.
The experiment took place at the Montpellier Laboratory for Experimental Economics
(LEEM) in France. The experimental protocol was presented to the LEEM working group,
which ensured that the protocol was in compliance with the rules of experimental econom-
ics and the corresponding ethical rules. The latter gave its agreement for the experiment to
be carried out within the LEEM platform. We organized six sessions (two per treatment),
each with 16 or 20 participants. A total of 104 subjects took part in the experiment. The
mean age of the participants was 26 years (std. 6.58, median age 24 years), with 56.73% of
women and 43.27% of men. The participants were students from various disciplines of the
university of Montpellier randomly selected from a pool of nearly 3,000 volunteers handled
with the Online Recruitment Software for Economic Experiments (ORSEE, [30]). We made
sure that none of the participants had previously participated in a common-pool resource
game. The experiment took place on a computer. Each subject was in an individual
box with partitions around them to ensure anonymity of decisions. The sessions lasted
approximately one and a half hours, including initial instructions and payments. The aver-
age payment in the game was € 13.
Conjectures
The first conjecture states that even if there is no direct reward associated with sharing, many
players voluntarily share their extraction decision. By no direct reward associated with sharing,
we mean that there was no monetary gain in the game associated with the action of sharing its
extraction. The payoffs of the game depended solely on the extraction choices of the player
and the members of their group.
Conjecture 1: Individuals voluntarily disclose extractions with significant frequency.
There are several possible motivations behind a player’s choice to disclose their decision, as
explained by [21]. These motivations include the willingness to signal an intention to cooper-
ate [5]; a warm-glow effect [17]; a feeling about the right level of extraction in the game, i.e. the
extraction that is socially appropriate [16], or the descriptive norm that should apply in the
group [19]. In the Voluntary Disclosure treatment, since the values disclosed are the actual
extractions, non-cooperative individuals have no interest in making their extractions public if
they think they might negatively influence the choice of others. In addition, some studies have
shown that individuals who do not behave in a pro-social manner may feel guilty or ashamed
when it is observable by others ([31–33], see also [34] for a theoretical model). Therefore, we
expect that the voluntary sharing mechanism of the VD treatment will favor the emergence of
upward social information i.e. cooperative individuals disclose their extractions and non-
cooperative individuals keep them private.
To corroborate this, we should observe in the VD treatment that the disclosed extractions
are lower compared to the non-disclosed ones (Conjecture 2.1). Given the arguments under-
pinning conjectures 1 and 2.1, there are several reasons to believe that extractions in the VD
treatment will be lower compared to extractions in the MD treatment (Conjecture 2.2). First,
we know from several studies that almost 50% of individuals are conditional cooperators [20,
35–37]. If these conditional cooperators observe cooperative decisions, they are likely to make
cooperative decisions as well. Second, it has been shown that social information favors the con-
vergence of decisions towards observed decisions [10–12, 38, 39], and that this imitation
dynamic lies behind the formation of social norms [19, 40].
Conjecture 2: In the Voluntary Disclosure treatment:
1. the disclosed extractions are lower than the non-disclosed ones
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2. the average extractions are lower than in the Mandatory Disclosure treatment
The effect of the Free Disclosure mechanism isn’t so straightforward. On one hand, coopera-
tive players are supposed to consent to make their decision public and to disclose the amount
actually extracted, while non-cooperative players are supposed to prefer to hide their extrac-
tion (as in the VD mechanism). As a result, the disclosed extractions should be lower than the
non-disclosed ones (Conjecture 3.1). Yet on the other hand, some of the cooperative players
may use the freedom to choose the value disclosed to signal the socially optimum solution,
even if their actual extraction is a little higher. This is an attempt not to lose too much money
while the (symmetric) socially optimal solution is not achieved. In addition, non-cooperative
players can hide behind a false declared extraction; lower than the actual one, to benefit from
the possible influence of this signal on the other members of the group (Conjecture 3.2). [41]
shows that for some people their concern over appearing honest and cooperative may out-
weigh their desire to actually be honest and cooperative. These people prefer lying to appearing
selfish. This is common knowledge, which can call into question the self-selection mechanism
induced by voluntary sharing mentioned in the argumentation of conjecture 2.1. If this strate-
gic behavior is detected, it can: undermine trust in the group; prevent the formation of a group
norm (or norm compliance) and cause conditional cooperators to reduce their cooperation.
Overall, the Free Disclosure mechanism is likely to create noise in the disclosed social informa-
tion and thus cause difficulties for the group in managing the common-pool resource. As it
stands, we are not able to predict the outcome of the Free Disclosure treatment with certainty,
as it partly depends on the composition of the group (the number of unconditional coopera-
tors, conditional cooperators, and non-cooperators). We nevertheless expect that the average
extractions would be lower than in the Mandatory Disclosure treatment (Conjecture 3.3),
because on average only one third of people are non-cooperative (free-riders, [20]), and proba-
bly not all are willing to lie to gain more on the backs of others.
Conjecture 3: In the Free Disclosure treatment:
1. the disclosed extractions are lower than the non-disclosed extractions
2. the disclosed extractions are lower than the actual extractions
3. the average extractions are lower than in the Mandatory Disclosure treatment
Results
When voluntary disclosure was offered to players (VD and FD treatments), most of them
decided to make their decision public; as shown in Fig 1, in support of our first conjecture.
More specifically, in the VD treatment, more than 30% of players chose to disclose their
extraction decision 100% of the time. This percentage dropped to 16% in the FD treatment
but; as can be seen in the figure, between 5 and 15% of players revealed their decision at least
10 periods out of 20 (50% of the time). The graph at the bottom of the figure shows that the fre-
quency of information sharing was relatively constant over time (between 60% and 85%) with
a decrease however in the VD treatment that was not observed in the FD treatment.
Treatment effect
Table 3 provides statistics on the average level of extraction depending on the treatment and
Fig 2 displays the average extraction trends for the three treatments. From the first round,
without any prior information about the other members’ behavior in the group, the VD treat-
ment stood out from the MD and FD treatments with a lower average extraction level (7.31 vs
8.06 and 8.03 respectively). This initial effect persisted all throughout the game, even though
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with replications the three treatments converged towards the choice of the dominant strategy,
as is often the case in experimental social dilemma games [42, 43]. We observe in Fig 2 that the
average extraction in the MD treatment was almost always higher than in the other two treat-
ments. Non-parametric tests (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) comparing the average extractions of
the three treatments confirmed that the averages in the MD treatment were significantly
higher than in the VD treatment (rank-sum test statistic = 4.193, p-value < .001) and also
higher than in the FD treatment (rank-sum test statistic = 3.111, p-value = .002), supporting
conjectures 2.2 and 3.3. On the other hand, the two voluntary sharing treatments were not sig-
nificantly different from each other (rank-sum test statistic = -1.258, p-value = .208).
Fig 1. Frequency of voluntary disclosure.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240212.g001
Table 3. Summary statistics.
Average extraction (std)
Treatment # Groups Round 1 Rounds 1 to 10 Rounds 11 to 20 Rounds 1 to 20
MD 8 8.06 (2.20) 9.00 (1.83) 9.45 (1.46) 9.22 (1.67)
VD 9 7.31 (2.66) 7.84 (2.55) 8.86 (2.31) 8.35 (2.49)
FD 9 8.03 (2.43) 8.26 (2.40) 9.06 (1.77) 8.66 (2.14)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240212.t003
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To further analyze the data, we consider the following econometric model. Let yit be the
extraction of player i in round t. This amount is both left and right-censored, i.e. 0� yit� 10.
We have a dynamic panel data model: yit = ρyi,t-1 + xit’b + μi + εit; i = 1, 2,. . ., N; t = 1, 2,. . ., T,
where yi,t-1 is the extraction of player i in the previous round, xit corresponds to the whole set
of explanatory variables including both time-variant variables (total extraction of player i’s
group in t-1; decision-making time; information-related variables such as dummy of informa-
tion sharing and the number of individuals who disclosed their decision in the previous
round) and time-invariant variables (treatment dummy variables). The main concern of our
model is that during the experiment players can learn about the decision process. We think
that past individual and group decisions can have an impact on the individual’s current deci-
sion. This thus corresponds to the concept of state dependence, persistence in individual deci-
sions over time, or learning effects often highlighted in the literature. It is recognized that the
dynamic nature of the model is related to the well-known initial conditions problem leading to
the inconsistency of traditional estimators in panel data econometrics (see for example [44,
45]). Note that the regression error term is composed of two parts: an idiosyncratic error εit
and an individual-specific effect μi. Following [45], the initial conditions problem can be fixed
by specifying a more general model where the μi are defined as correlated random effects with
the following assumption: μi | yi1, zi ~ N(α0 + α1 yi1 +zi’γ, s2m). This assumption appears to be
general enough, as it suggests that an individual-specific effect depends not only on the initial
extracted amount yi1, but also on a set of values of explanatory variables (zi� xi1,. . ., xiT). The
model with this assumption therefore corresponds to a dynamic Tobit model for panel data
with correlated random effects (CRE). It results that the whole set of explanatory variables of
our model includes: the lagged individual extraction yi,t-1; the control variables included in xit;
the initial individual decision yi1 and the set of auxiliary regressors zi.
Fig 2. Evolution of average extraction per treatment.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240212.g002
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A comparison between nonlinear dynamic models with correlated random effects and it’s
fixed effects counterpart was beyond the scope of this study (a reference to [45, 46], among
others will provide more details on this issue). However, we can list at least three advantages of
the CRE approach. Firstly, it specifies a more general distribution for the individual effects that
can be correlated with the regressors. Secondly, this approach makes it possible to calculate the
average partial (or marginal) effects. Finally, the endogeneity of some regressors can be conve-
niently handled by using the control function approach of [46]. Furthermore, estimation of
the CRE dynamic Tobit model, compared to the dynamic Tobit model with standard random
effects, implies two additional sets of variables: initial decision (yi1) and a set of auxiliary vari-
ables (zi). A likelihood-ratio (LR) test was performed to compare the two models. The null
hypothesis corresponded to α1 = γ = 0. For the whole sample (all treatments included), the test
statistic was 275.93 and the p-value of the chi-squared distribution with 58 degrees of freedom
was close to 0, leading to the rejection of the original model in favor of the dynamic Tobit
model with correlated random effects. This test shows the importance of the initial observation
problem, which has to be controlled for. The significance (at the 10% level) of this coefficient
(α1, Table 4) provides an illustration of this result, which reveals the presence of an anchoring
Table 4. Estimation results for the whole sample using the CRE dynamic Tobit model with individual extraction
as the dependent variable.
Variable Coefficient Partial effect
(Std.Err.) (Std.Err.)
Individual past decision 0.006 0.002
(0.061) (0.021)
Group past decision 0.133�� 0.046��
(0.030) (0.010)
Decision-making time -0.049�� -0.017��
(0.010) (0.003)
Treatment VD -1.830�� -0.636��
(0.563) (0.195)
Treatment FD -2.171�� -0.753��
(1.040) (0.361)
Time trend 0.163�� 0.056��
(0.019) (0.006)
Individual initial decision 0.178� 0.062�
(0.095) (0.033)
Intercept -8.229
(5.148)
Log-likelihood -2129.767
Wald test for model significance χ2 (63) = 902.19 p-value<0.001
LR test for CRE dynamic Tobit without controls χ2 (21) = 143.09 p-value<0.001
LR test for standard RE static Tobit χ2 (59) = 278.01 p-value<0.001
Number of observations 1976
Number of individuals 104
Uncensored observations 672
Left-censored observations 26
Right-censored observations 1278
Notes: Standard errors are given in brackets. Significance level:
�10%
��5%.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240212.t004
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effect (although not as strong) due to the first decision as underlined by [47]. Table 4 presents
estimation results. We compared our CRE dynamic Tobit model to the static Tobit model
with standard random effects by using a likelihood-ratio χ2 test. The results showed unambig-
uously that the static model was dominated by our model for the whole sample. We also ran
the CRE dynamic Tobit model without control variables (“Decision-making time” and “Time
trend”). The signs of the coefficients of our main variables remained unchanged. Moreover,
the likelihood-ratio test (which was a χ2 distributed under the null) showed that our model
was strongly preferred. We report the estimated coefficients and the corresponding partial
effects of explanatory variables on the expected value of individual extraction (given that it is
censored at 0 and 10). Note that this quantity is defined by E(yit) = Pr(0� yit� 10)
� E(yit|
0� yit� 10) + 10
� Pr(yit > 10), where E(yit|0� yit� 10) is the expected value of the depen-
dent variable when it is truncated at 0 and 10. The estimated partial effects are globally consis-
tent with the estimated coefficients as the signs and the significance are very similar. We find
that both treatments where disclosure of decisions is on a voluntary basis; specifically the VD
and FD treatments, have a significant negative impact on the amount extracted in the game
(however, the two coefficients are not different from each other, χ2 = 0.10, p-value = 0.755).
This confirms what can be seen in Fig 2, and also confirms the non-parametric tests reported
above. The estimation further shows that individual decisions are strongly related to what the
players observed from the group during the previous round and that there is a natural ten-
dency towards higher extraction as time elapses. Estimates also reveal that extracting less from
the common resource seems to be based on a more cognitive decision-making process since
the shorter the decision-time, the higher the extraction [48]. This is consistent with the study
of [49] which found that faster subjects more often choose the option with the highest payoff
for themselves. Finally, the estimation shows that with all else equal, the first extraction deci-
sion in the game matters. This decision was taken without any prior knowledge about the
behavior of the group as it took place just after the reading of the instructions for the experi-
ment. [47] also observed this phenomenon. Hence, even if a mechanism tries to influence the
dynamics of the individual’s decision process, the individual’s initial intention remains a
strong anchor [50].
Information sharing effect
Fig 3 provides several useful curves to understand what happened in the two voluntary disclo-
sure treatments. The VD treatment is on the left graph and the FD treatment is on the right
graph. First, there is the average of the non-disclosed extractions (dotted line and triangle
marker facing down). Second, there is the average of the disclosed extractions (dashed line and
triangle marker). In the VD treatment, this average corresponds exactly to the curve of the dis-
played extractions. For the FD treatment we have added the average of the displayed extrac-
tions, which in this treatment can be different from the actual extractions of the players (dash-
dot line with pentagon marker). Finally, we report the average extraction (plain line with star
marker), i.e. the same curves as in Fig 2 for these treatments.
Clearly, the players who decided to disclose their decision extracted less than the others.
This holds in both treatments (Wilcoxon test p-value < .001 in both treatments), with a larger
difference for VD than for FD, however. This supports conjectures 2.1 and 3.1. In the VD
treatment, we find that the overall average of the extractions and the average of the disclosed
extractions (disclosed value) are very close and follow the same trajectory. This is consistent
with the expected effects of social information. These being: imitation; convergence of deci-
sions with observed decisions and creation of a norm within the group [10–12, 19, 38–40].
Conversely, in the FD treatment the average of the displayed extractions differs greatly from
PLOS ONE Contrasting effects of information sharing on CPR extraction behaviour
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240212 October 7, 2020 11 / 20
the average of the actual extractions of the group, thus being in line with conjecture 3.2. The
average extraction curve for players who did not disclose their choices is higher in the VD
treatment than in the FD treatment. The difference comes from the fact that in the VD treat-
ment the least cooperative individuals did not disclose their choices, whereas in the FD treat-
ment they disclosed an extraction value, even if it did not correspond to their actual extraction.
Fig 4 helps to further understand the FD treatment. The graph shows three new curves in
addition to the curve of the average extractions of players who chose not to disclose their
Fig 3. Evolution of average extractions depending on whether or not they were disclosed.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240212.g003
Fig 4. Actual extractions in FD for players who did not disclose their decisions, for players who disclosed their actual extraction, and
for players who disclosed an amount different from the actual one. For the last case the disclosed amount is also shown.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240212.g004
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extractions. The first curve corresponds to the average of the extractions of players who dis-
closed their decision and did not lie in the value they entered (dotted line with triangle
marker). The second curve shows the average of the extractions of players who disclosed their
decision but entered a value different from their actual extraction (dash-dot line with square
marker). Finally, the third curve shows the average of the values entered by the latter players
(small dotted line with star marker). It is clear that players who lied about the amount they
reported extracted far more than those who disclosed their actual extraction (Wilcoxon p-
value < .001) and also more than those who refused to make their decision public (Wilcoxon
p-value = .010). However, as can be seen with the curve of the values they entered, these players
seem to have quickly understood that the social optimum was to extract 5 units. The freedom
given to the players to decide for themselves the extraction that would be disclosed favored the
emergence of a strategic behavior consisting in reporting an extraction close to the social opti-
mum. They sent a false signal, expecting others to decrease their extraction in order to increase
their individual profit. After the tenth round, when the average extraction starts to increase,
one can observe a disclosed extraction by lying players that decreases. A simple linear regres-
sion (individual reported extractions on rounds) gives a coefficient value -0.08 for rounds 1 to
10 and to -0.14 for rounds 11 to 20, which are not statistically different at the 5% level. We
have not explored the reason why these participants report an extraction level lower than the
socially optimal value. The assumption we can make is that it is a way to slow down the
increase towards the maximum extraction. In order to identify the effects of specific explana-
tory variables (in particular those related to information sharing), estimations were carried out
treatment-by-treatment. Table 5 presents the estimation results of the same model (dynamic
Tobit with correlated random effects) for the MD, VD, and FD treatments respectively. As in
the case of the whole sample, we performed an LR test to compare the models with and with-
out correlated random effects (i.e. null hypothesis α1 = γ = 0) for each of the three treatments.
The result was unambiguously in favor of the CRE dynamic Tobit model (test statistic was
61.051, 93.543, and 90.688 for the MD, VD and FD treatments respectively). In addition, test
results for every treatment were also favorable to our model when it was compared to either
the static Tobit model with standard random effects or the CRE dynamic Tobit model without
control variables (see Table 5). As the estimated partial effects are consistent with the estimated
coefficients (i.e. they have similar signs and significance levels), we can rely on any of the two
sets of coefficients to interpret the results. Table 5 provides estimation results for the MD treat-
ment in the first column. By definition, the set of explanatory variables does not contain any
factors related to the voluntary sharing mechanism. The estimated coefficients are therefore
similar to the case of the whole sample presented in Table 4.
The models estimated for the VD and FD treatments include additional variables linked to
the voluntary disclosure mechanism. More precisely, for the VD treatment we added two
dummy variables to indicate whether or not players consented to disclose their extractions in
the current and in the previous round (“Information sharing, current round” and “Informa-
tion sharing, previous round”). We also added the number of members in the group who
chose to disclose their individual decision. In the FD treatment; as players could report an
extraction that was different from the actual one, there were three possible situations, each of
them corresponding to a dummy variable: (i) the players refused to disclose their decision (the
reference); (ii) they consented but reported an extraction that was different from the actual
one (“Information sharing & lying”) and (iii) they consented and reported their actual extrac-
tion (“Information sharing & non-lying”). We added the present and the past value for the lat-
ter two dummies. It should be noted that including whether or not extractions were disclosed
might have created an estimation bias. Indeed, individuals could simultaneously make multi-
ple decisions about (i) their extraction; (ii) their choice on whether or not to disclose their
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decision and (iii) the amount they reported. This phenomenon led us to consider the corre-
sponding explanatory variables as endogenous regressors (i.e. the variable “Information shar-
ing, current period” for the VD treatment, and the variables “Information sharing & lying,
current round” and “Information sharing & non-lying, current round” for the FD treatment).
For this purpose, we applied the control function approach proposed by [46], which is
Table 5. Estimation results by treatment, using the CRE dynamic Tobit model with individual extraction as the dependent variable.
MD VD FD
Variable Coefficient Partial effect Coefficient Partial effect Coefficient Partial effect
(Std. Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std.Err.)
Individual past decision 0.260� 0.058� 0.217�� 0.090�� -0.333�� -0.131��
(0.140) (0.031) (0.106) (0.044) (0.133) (0.053)
Group past decision 0.189�� 0.042�� 0.065� 0.027� 0.178�� 0.070��
(0.068) (0.015) (0.037) (0.015) (0.061) (0.024)
Decision-making time -0.049�� -0.011�� -0.059�� -0.024�� -0.073�� -0.029��
(0.018) (0.004) (0.014) (0.006) (0.021) (0.008)
Time trend 0.133�� 0.030�� 0.175�� 0.072�� 0.139�� 0.055��
(0.044) (0.010) (0.029) (0.012) (0.056) (0.022)
Individual initial decision 0.059 0.013 0.476�� 0.197�� -0.119 -0.047
(0.253) (0.057) (0.141) (0.058) (0.126) (0.050)
Information sharing, current round 4.629 1.915
(3.384) (1.396)
Information sharing, previous round -3.382�� -1.399��
(1.549) (0.638)
Information sharing, #members in the group 0.013 0.005 -0.180 -0.071
(0.247) (0.102) (0.289) (0.114)
Information sharing & lying, current round 4.530 1.791
(3.855) (1.523)
Information sharing & non-lying, current round 8.347 3.301
(5.276) (2.082)
Information sharing & lying, previous round -2.188 -0.865
(1.748) (0.690)
Information sharing & non-lying, previous round -4.731� -1.871�
(2.694) (1.063)
Intercept -10.860 -6.737�� -14.047��
(14.438) (1.596) (4.576)
Log-likelihood -470.06 -783.55 -823.01
Wald test for model significance Χ2 (23) = 165.15 p < .001 Χ2 (27) = 534.49 p < .001 Χ2 (30) = 345.13 p < .001
LR test for CRE dynamic Tobit without controls Χ2 (2) = 20.15 p < .001 Χ2 (2) = 70.16 p < .001 Χ2 (2) = 51.23 p < .001
LR test for standard RE static Tobit Χ2 (21) = 67.12 p < .001 Χ2 (21) = 94.38 p < .001 Χ2 (20) = 92.02 p < .001
Number of observations 608 684 684
Number of individuals 32 36 36
Uncensored observations 133 269 270
Left-censored observations 2 4 20
Right-censored observations 473 411 394
Notes: Standard errors are given in brackets. Significance level:
�10%
��5%.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240212.t005
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particularly suitable for nonlinear models such as our Tobit model with correlated random
effects. Table 5 provides estimation results that account for this endogeneity bias. Based on a
robust t-test (also proposed by [46]), we found that the exogeneity of these regressors could
not be held even if their coefficients were not statistically significant. In other words, an esti-
mation assuming the exogeneity of these regressors could lead to misinterpretation.
The control function approach of [46], consisting of a two-step estimation, is relatively sim-
ple to implement. At the first step, a probit model for the endogenous regressor is estimated in
order to obtain a generalized residual. The second step corresponds to the estimation of the
usual nonlinear model (i.e. Tobit model with correlated random effects) with the previously
computed generalized residuals as an additional regressor. See [46] for more computational
details. Lastly, we performed a robust t-test for the significance of these generalized residuals.
For the VD treatment, the t-statistic was -2.08, while for the FD treatment, the t-statistic was
-1.20 for the first generalized residuals (corresponding to “Information sharing & lying, cur-
rent round”) and -1.97 for the second generalized residuals (“Information sharing & non-
lying, current round”). This result implies the significance of generalized residuals in the non-
linear regressions, thereby supporting the control for endogeneity of information sharing
when using data in the VD and FD treatments.
In the VD treatment, the model estimates confirm that the player’s decision in the current
round was strongly influenced by the player’s decision in the first round of the game and by
their decision in the previous round. The anchoring effect observed in Table 4 is ultimately sig-
nificant only in this treatment. For us this can be interpreted by the fact that there is less noise
in the information available to players in the VD treatment, as players can trust the information
and easily identify good will. The total extraction of the group in the previous round also exerted
a strong influence on the player’s current extraction decision. Moreover, estimates confirm that
a player who decided to make their extraction public in the previous round extracted less in the
current round than an individual who preferred to keep their extraction private in the previous
round (supporting conjecture 2.1). In the FD treatment, the extraction of the player in the previ-
ous round had a negative impact on their extraction in the current round, and the extraction of
the player in the first round of the game was not a significant variable in the model. Our inter-
pretation is that the social information in this treatment is less selective and has a strategic
dimension, which seems to result in players fluctuating more in their extraction decisions. The
estimates also tell us that what the player did in the previous round had more influence than
what they intended to do in the current round. Thus, the information sharing variables (yes
with a lie or yes without a lie) of the current round are not significant compared to the reference
variable (no information sharing). A player who decided to make their "true" extraction public
in the previous round (i.e. without a lie) extracted less in the current round than a player who
preferred to keep their extraction private or who made it public but displayed a "false" value (i.e.
lied). Thus, in both voluntary sharing treatments, it can be said that the individuals who con-
tribute to better management of the common resource are those who are willing to make their
extractions public with complete honesty and transparency.
Conclusion
The management of common resources is an everyday universal challenge on both a large
scale; such as with the oceans or the atmosphere, and also in local situations; such as the use of
a borehole shared by a small community. Many factors contribute to improving the manage-
ment of these resources, as was shown by Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom in numerous arti-
cles. Among these factors there is information about the actions of other users of the resource,
which is commonly referred to as social information. The effects of this social information are
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mixed. On one hand, it stimulates cooperative actions, as users may feel obliged to show signs
of cooperation [5]. Moreover, it provides users with the opportunity to send a signal about the
expected cooperation within the group and the social norm that seems appropriate [16, 19].
On the other hand, however, it is likely to spotlight the least cooperative users. Those users;
due to the structure of the social dilemma, have higher earnings than cooperative users as the
exploitation of the resource generates individual profits. Therefore, if users tend to imitate the
best performance, over-exploitation of the resource is inevitable and can be accelerated by
social information [8].
Providing information about the actions taken by all the users in the group is therefore not
necessarily beneficial. In this article we proposed setting up a system of voluntary sharing of
information, in order to keep the beneficial effects of disseminating information (signal) and
mitigate its negative effects (imitation of the most selfish), and therefore to favor the emer-
gence of upward social information [10]. We experimentally tested two voluntary information
sharing mechanisms. In the first one, the players were only invited to indicate whether they
agreed to publicize their level of extraction. In the second one, the players were free to decide
whether or not to disclose their level of extraction, but they were additionally responsible for
reporting the amount that was made public. We compared these treatments with a benchmark
treatment in which individual decisions were automatically and mandatorily disclosed. We
could have used a benchmark with no social information at all, i.e. with only aggregate infor-
mation on the total amount extracted by the group. This may be a limitation of this study, but
our main concern was to test a mechanism that allows for self-selection of the social informa-
tion provided to users of a common resource. For the two voluntary disclosure mechanisms,
the data exhibited a lower average extraction compared to the system with automatic and man-
datory disclosure of decisions and therefore reduced the phenomenon of over-exploitation of
the resource. The main reason is that voluntary disclosure allows selection in the social infor-
mation disseminated to players. The more cooperative players make their actions public, while
less cooperative players keep this information private, so as not to have a negative influence on
others and thus accelerate the tragedy of the commons. However, while the voluntary disclo-
sure mechanism leaves players free to set the reported amount extracted, less cooperative play-
ers exploit the strategic dimension. Those players do not hesitate to lie in an attempt to gain
more from the common-pool resource. Ultimately, this is likely to undermine the beneficial
effect of the mechanism by breaking trust in the group and preventing the formation of a social
norm.
[21] showed that the voluntary disclosure mechanism improves the average contribution to
the production of a public good. Our study showed that the benefits of this mechanism are still
valid in an extractive common resource context. Further investigation is however required to
better understand the ins and outs of voluntary information disclosure mechanisms. For
example, [21] tested the mechanism in small groups like we did (group size of 5 and 4, respec-
tively). It would be interesting to test it in larger groups where it would be more difficult to
influence the norm or to infer the extraction levels that others do not disclose. Furthermore,
information was shared anonymously, so the effects of the reputation mechanism when ano-
nymity is lifted may need to be studied. This could increase the motivation of individuals to
signal themselves as cooperative, and also limit the strategic behavior of displaying a value
lower than the actual extraction. In the same vein, identifying the type of players upstream of
the game (unconditional cooperator, conditional cooperator, free-rider or other); with a pro-
cedure inspired by those proposed by [20] and [51], would make it possible to learn more
about individual behaviour in the game according to the voluntary sharing mechanism put in
place. Finally, it would be interesting to test the voluntary information-sharing mechanism in
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a dynamic environment, where the resource is constantly evolving. It is a more complex
framework but also closer to reality for common resources [52].
The development of new technologies and of the Internet of Things (IoT) greatly facilitates
the sharing and the disclosure of information through smart devices. As a result of this, consid-
eration can be given to new mechanisms for managing common-pool resources. Smart grids
and smart meters are examples of devices that allow this purpose to be pursued. For instance,
in the electricity sector regulators are able to monitor grid traffic in real time and take appro-
priate actions to reduce stress on the grid in peak hours. At the same time, users can receive
information; such as electricity pricing, through variable pricing on a real time basis and are
better incentivized to manage and adjust their energy consumption [53]. Using smart devices
to manage common resources does however come up against the problem of the social accept-
ability of the automatic and mandatory collection of individual data. Adopting voluntary
based data collection could help to solve part of this problem.
The efficient management of a common-pool resource at a reasonable cost is a serious chal-
lenge for decision-makers. The voluntary dimension of providing information about resource
extraction can be a useful tool in this direction. If the regulator only installs smart meters for
voluntary users, it reduces costs compared to a generalized installation. In addition, if the regu-
lator asks users to self-report their extractions, it eliminates metering installation and operat-
ing costs. The cost in this case is for the user to self-report. However, audits need to
accompany self-reporting systems and partial installations of meters. The regulator must
therefore calculate the trade-off between the costs of installing meters and the costs of auditing
unmetered users. When users self-report their extractions, the number of audits should be
higher, as some users will declare amounts that are different from their actual extractions. In
California for instance, the law on sustainable groundwater management; adopted by the State
in 2004, stipulates that the board requires annual extraction reports and that metering may be
required to acquire the data. The board can then issue orders to acquire the information that is
needed. The full text can be found online at https://mavensnotebook.com/2020/01/23/sgma-
implementation-groundwater-sustainability-evaluation-and-state-water-board-intervention/
and https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/gmp/intervention.html.
The dissemination of extraction data for social information purposes represents a step
towards voluntary provision, i.e. the case data collected by the regulator is revealed to end-
users. As many authors have shown with laboratory and field experiments, social information
and the following social comparison (see also [54–56] for research on social comparison
nudges), lead users to adopt more cooperative behaviors. With a voluntary disclosure mecha-
nism, the dissemination of social information becomes possible, and since it is selective, its
efficiency is increased; as shown by [21] and by us in this paper. The free information disclo-
sure mechanism we have proposed in this article is even more likely to foster social acceptabil-
ity. However, as we have seen, it introduces opportunistic and strategic behaviors which may
offset the benefits of social information in the long run and on a larger population scale. To
address this problem the mechanism could be accompanied by audit systems similar to those
for tax returns. This would increase the cost of the mechanism but is also likely to further
increase its effectiveness. This is something that should be examined and tested in further
investigations.
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